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Plaintiff herewith replies to the amici curiae brief of the 
Utah Manufacturers Association, Utah Petroleum Association and 
the Utah Mining Association. These are referred to hereinafter 
as Associations. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE 
Does the language of the 1975 amendment to Utah Code 
Annotated, § 35-1-62; the legislative history of such amendment 
and the pertinent cases of the Utah Supreme Court prior to and 
following such amendment uphold Plaintiff-Appellant's right to 
sue a subcontractor and general contractor for negligence who are 
not her actual employer on the construction site. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Senate Bill 2 6 was introduced in the Utah State Senate with 
Senator Pettersson as chief sponsor on January 14, 1975. The 
purposes of such bill were to amend the Utah Workmen's 
Compensation Act and, in particular, insofar as the instant case 
is concerned, Section 35-1-62 Utah Code Annotated. (Page 69 
Senate Journal 1975.) 
The Senate Committee on Labor, Business & Economic 
Development favorably recommended the Bill to the Senate. The 
second reading of Senate Bill 2 6 occurred on February 25, 1975. 
Persons testifying before the Senate, which at the time was 
acting as a committee of the whole, were Messers. Lynn Richards, 
Frank Lay, Steve Hadley, Blair Kinnersley, Erie Berman and Paul 
Kunz. (Page 770 Senate Journal 1975.) Mr. Richards testified on 
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behalf of management and Mr. Berman testified on behalf of the 
Utah Mining Association- Mr. Steve Hadley testified on behalf of 
the Utah Industrial Commission and Mr. Paul Kunz testified on 
behalf of the Utah Bar Association as its President. (Disc 
recordings Senate Secretary (191 and 192) 
The only substantive discussion and explanation of Senate 
Bill 2 6 that concerned the effect and purpose of the amendment to 
Section 35-1-62 occurred during testimony of Mr. Kunz. (Addendum 
Transcript of Senate Secretary Disc. 192) 
The third reading of Senate Bill 26 occurred on March 3, 
1975. (Page 853 Senate Journal 1975) 
Senate bill 26 was passed by the Senate March 3, 1975 
without a dissenting vote in the form of the proposed amendment 
to Section 35-1-62 as initially introduced. (Page 864 Senate 
Journal 1975) It was sent to the House of Representatives which 
passed said bill March 5, 1975 without amendment. It was signed 
by the President of the Senate on the same date and transmitted 
to the governor. (Page 955 1975 Senate Journal) The amendment 
became law on March 19, 1975 when signed by the Governor. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The language of the 1975 amendment to Section 35-1-62, when 
compared with the then existing language of said section, and 
Utah Supreme court cases before and after 1975 demonstrates that 
the Utah Legislature intended that an injured subcontractor 
employee on a construction project could have no tort action for 
damages against his actual employer but could sue all other 
2 
contractor entities thereon not meeting the test of being his 
actual employer. 
The foregoing intent of the Utah Legislature is also clearly 
shown in testimony before the Senate during debate on amending 
Sec. 35-1-62 on February 25, 1975. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE INTENT OF THE UTAH LEGISLATURE IN AMENDING UCA SEC. 
35-1-62 IN 1975 WAS TO PERMIT TORT ACTIONS BY AN INJURED 
EMPLOYEE OF A SUBCONTRACTOR AGAINST OTHER SUB OR GENERAL 
CONTRACTORS WHO NEGLIGENTLY CAUSE HIS INJURIES IS 
DEMONSTRATED BY THE AMENDMENTS' LEGISLATIVE HISTORY. 
The pertinent terms of Section 35-1-62 as passed in 1939, 
which were amended in 1975 by Senate Bill 26, read as follows: 
"When any injury or death for which compensation is 
payable under this title shall have been caused by the 
wrongful act or neglect of another person not in the 
same emp1oyment, the injured employee...may also have 
an action for damages against such third person." 
(emphasis added) 
The 1975 amendment to section 3 5-1-62 reads as follows: 
"For the purpose of this section and notwithstanding 
the provisions of section 35-1-42, the injured employee 
.... may also maintain an action for damages against 
subcontractors, general contractors, independent 
contractors, property owners or their lessees or 
assigns, not occupying an employee-employer 
relationship with the injured or deceased employee at 
the time of his injury or death." (emphasis added) 
Utah Code Annotated Section 35-1-42, which was not amended 
in 1975, apparently intended to define "statutory employers" 
according to historical concepts surrounding such term. This 
Section along with UCA Sec. 35-1-62 Pre-1975 led the Utah Supreme 
Court to rule that generally an injured subcontractor employee 
could not have a tort action against other subcontractors or the 
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general contractor if they were engaged in work on the same 
project. The rationale appeared to be that all other 
subcontractors and general contractors on the job site were 
perforce "in the same employment" and thus "statutory employers" 
immune from suit or that a general contractor, at least, 
exercised sufficient control over a subcontractor's employees to 
be immune. 
Noteworthy decisions so holding were Adamson v. Okland 
Construction Company, Inc., 508 P.2nd 805 (Utah, 1973) and Smith 
v. Alfred Brown Co., 493 P.2nd 994 (Utah, 1972). The effect of 
these decisions was to limit, for all practical purposes, 
recovery by an injured employee to workmen's compensation 
benefits no matter how grievously he was injured by the wrongful 
neglect of other contractors on the job. 
The 1975 amendment of section 35-1-62 eliminated the words 
"not in the same employment" and substituted the words "not 
occupying an employee-employer relationship with the injured or 
deceased employee.." Inasmuch as the Utah Code already defined 
"statutory employer" in section 35-1-42, both before and after 
1975, such amendment is redundant unless the legislature intended 
to permit an injured employee to sue any other contractor on the 
project, but his actual employer, whose negligence injured him. 
That the 1975 legislature, intended to permit suits as set 
forth above and to reverse the result of the Adamson and Smith 
cases, supra, is established by the legislative history. The 
only debate and testimony on the Senate floor that touched upon 
4 
the purposes of the 1975 amendment of section 35-1-62 is set out 
in the transcript attached to this Brief as an Addendum. The 
following portions of such transcript should be noted: 
"The law that was passed in 1921 had the wording 
'wrongful act of a third person1. In 1939 the words 
•third person1 were taken out and substituted....1 the 
wrongful act or neglect of another person not in the 
same employment.' 
"....The situation prior to the change was that if two 
men were working on a project and one was employed by a 
general contractor and a third person could be an 
employee of a subcontractor ...who came on the job and 
injured the employee...such employee... had a right of 
action against the wrongdoer for his damages in 
addition to his compensation..." 
"The result of changing this language from 'third 
person1 to 'not in the same employment' has resulted in 
a number of court decisions that have completely 
eliminated the protection that the worker had..." 
"...There is a great deal of safety in men who are 
concerned for each other, who work for the same 
employer, who work under the same conditions. They 
come under the same foreman's inspection and so on." 
"It is a matter of clarification so that the injured 
man will know that, of course, he has no right of 
action against his own employer but when a stranger 
comes on the job whether it be a subcontractor, whether 
it be a delivery man or whether it be a stranger is 
subject to the same rules of safety and to the same 
obligation of law as to the injured man that any other 
stranger would be (under)..." (emphasis added) 
During the course of his testimony Senator Warren Pugh asked 
Mr. Kunz: 
"Are you in favor of this amendment?" 
Mr Kunz replied: 
"Yes, I am Senator. I think its a matter of simple 
justice that and also a matter of safety. This would 
permit third party suits but of course it would not 
permit suits against the employer as the law now 
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stands. The amendment would have the effect of 
permitting third party suits," 
It should be noted that the Senate subcommittee on Labor 
favorably reported out the 1974 amendment to section 35-1-62 and 
that such amendment passed the Senate unanimously except for 
three absent members. Furthermore, representatives of management 
and the Utah Mining Association as well as one from the AFL-CIO 
and Mr. Kunz testified before the Senate on February 25, 1975. 
No dissent was raised by any Association spokesman to the wording 
of the section 35-1-62 amendment or to the remarks of Mr. Kunz. 
Representatives of the AFL-CIO and the Associations testified 
before the Senate Labor Committee prior to said date. 
II. UTAH SUPREME COURT DECISIONS SUBSEQUENT TO THE 1975 
AMENDMENT OF SECTION 35-1-62 INDICATE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 
LEGISLATIVE INTENT TO PERMIT THE INJURED EMPLOYEE OF ONE 
CONTRACTOR TO SUE OTHER CONTRACTORS ON THE PROJECT WHOSE 
NEGLIGENCE INJURES HIM 
Under the 1975 amendment of 35-1-62 the injured employee 
cannot sue his actual employer for damages and as to such he is 
limited to compensation benefits. The employee, however, has a 
right to bring a tort action in damages against any other 
contractor entity on the project who negligently injures him. 
This is shown to be so in Shupe v. Wasatch Electric Co., 54 6 
P.2nd 896 (Utah, 1976). This involved the tort action of an 
injured employee of a subcontractor against a contractor entity 
on the job site who was not his actual employer. The Court 
ruled that, inasmuch as the injury occurred prior to 1975 the 
1975 amendment to section 35-1-62 did not apply. It found that 
the pre-1975 terms of said section "not in the same employment" 
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barred his suit against another contractor on the same project. 
This was in accordance with the Adamson and Smith cases, supra. 
The Court noted however that if the 1975 amendment had been 
applicable the plaintiff could have had a right to be in court 
against a contractor entity on the project other than his actual 
employer. 
The following language from the decision of the Court in 
Shupe appears significant: 
"...In both of those cases the contractor, by the terms 
of the contracts, retained supervision and control over 
the subcontractors." 
"...We do not believe that in this case the plaintiffs' 
decedent was an employee of the general contractor 
rather than being an employee of the subcontractor as 
was the case in Smith and Adamson...1 
"The legislature, undoubtedly being aware of the 
decisions of this court construing the terms "same 
employment" in 1975 amended Section 35-1-62 U.C.A. 1953 
by adding the following provision: (emphasis added) 
For the purposes of this section and 
notwithstanding the provisions of Section 35-1-42, 
the injured employee or his heirs or personal 
representatives may also maintain an action for 
damages against subcontractors, general 
contractors, independent contractors, property 
owners or their lessees or assigns, not occupying 
an employee-employer relationship with the injured 
or deceased employee at the time of his injury or 
death. 
"The amendment if applicable would leave the plaintiff 
in court." (emphasis added) 
It appears clear from the foregoing language that this Court 
recognizes that it was the intent of the 1975 legislature in 
amending section 35-1-62 to overturn the effects of Adamson and 
Smith, supra, to permit a suit by an injured employee against 
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other contractors on the site who injured him and who were not 
his employer in a direct sense. 
Hinds v. Herm Hughes & Sons, Inc. , 577 P. 2nd 561 (Utah, 
1978) holds that the employee of a subcontractor (Hinds) who was 
injured by the negligence of another subcontractor (Hughes)on the 
same job could have properly sued such entity provided Hughes did 
not directly supervise and control the work done by Hinds as an 
actual employer. An actual employer is generally deemed to be 
one who hires, fires, pays and controls the details of an 
employee's work through supervision by a foreman or the 
equivalent. The decision therefore sent the case back to the 
trial court for a determination as to whether or not Hinds under 
the circumstances was in fact under such control by Hughes that 
Hinds was an actual employee of Hughes. 
An injured employee may not bring a tort action against his 
actual employer. This exclusion, however, should be limited to 
that employer who hires, fires, compensates and controls all 
details of his employment and not to one who only has some 
general, indirect or tangential control. To rule otherwise would 
once more preclude proper tort actions against third party 
wrongdoers by injured employees and would emasculate the clearly 
expressed intent of the legislature in enacting the 1975 
amendment to section 35-1-62. 
III. THE CONTROLLING PUBLIC POLICY IN THIS CASE IS THAT 
EXPRESSED BY THE UTAH LEGISLATURE IN ITS 1975 AMENDMENT 
OF SECTION 35-1-62. 
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The amicus brief of the Associations presents what is 
essentially a plea that this Court should adopt public policy and 
philosophical views of other states or those of A. Larson in his 
work entitled "Workmen's Compensation Law." 
Such views might be probative in the absence of direct, 
contrary language chosen by the Utah Legislature in 1975 and/or 
in the absence of decisions of this Court holding otherwise. In 
fact the only philosophy or public policy that counts in this 
case is that expressed by the Utah Legislature's language in its 
1975 amendment to section 35-1-62. This, although it might be 
contrary to the views of A. Larson, demonstrates that, as a 
matter of public policy, Utah intends to permit an injured 
subcontractor employee to sue in tort any other contractor entity 
on the project who negligently injures him and who is not his 
actual employer as contrasted to a mere "statutory employer." 
Policy considerations in workmen's compensation cases cannot 
be applied by the courts to controvert the clear meaning of the 
statutory language that pertains to the issue concerned. Tisco 
Intermountain & State Insurance Fund v. Industrial Commission of 
Utah. Case No. 20913, decided September 29, 1987. 
It should also be noted that other writers who voice public 
policy views as to workmen's compensation laws differ from those 
expressed by A. Larson. Attention is invited to a treatise in 
the Harvard Law Review, Vol. 96, pages 1641 to 1661, entitled 
"Exceptions to the Exclusive Remedy Requirements of Workers' 
Compensation Statutes." 
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The foregoing treatise devotes itself to specified 
exceptions which are not pertinent here which permit an employee 
to bring a tort action against his actual employer. Nevertheless 
the public policy bases given as to these exceptions are worthy 
of note. 
The Harvard Law review treatise, supra, summarizes at the 
outset the writer's view as follows: 
"The continuing challenges to the exclusive remedy rule 
reveal an underlying tension between the workers1 
compensation system and the tort system. This Note 
examines the workers' compensation system as a response 
to the problem of work-related accidents and evaluates 
the significance and merit of the emerging exceptions 
to the exclusive remedy rule. The Note concludes that 
judicial resistance to worker tort suits has been 
excessive and that a more receptive attitude toward 
the doctrines underlying such suits would be both 
desirable and legitimate. " (Page 1641.) 
It should be noted that the writer of the Note would 
perforce favor the right of an injured employee to sue in tort 
any other contractor entity on the project who negligently 
injures him. The writer points out that permitting tort actions 
against contractors on a project other than the actual employer 
would, contrary to the views expressed by the Associations amicus 
brief, foster and enhance workplace safety. Clearly a general 
contractor or subcontractor who negligently injures the employee 
of another contractor would be far more likely to enforce safe 
worksite standards if they knew they could be subject to tort 
liability if they negligently acted. The Note states: 
"Employers are the appropriate party to bear accident 
costs, because they have greater control over workplace 
hazards than do workers and are generally better able 
to take preventive measures. Even to the extent that 
10 
worker behavior contributes to workplace accidents, 
however, imposing these costs on workers would have a 
negligible effect on safety. Workers have a built-in 
incentive to behave safely—self preservation—that 
influence their actions much more than does the 
financial aftermath of accidents." (Pages 1646 and 
1647) 
"....Thus, by failing to impose the full cost of work-
related accidents on employers, the workers1 
compensation system creates inadequate economic 
incentives for workplace safety." (Page 1647) 
"The present workers' compensation system is thus 
unsatisfactory both as a means of providing adequate 
relief to injured workers and as a mechanism for 
creating the proper incentive for the reduction of 
accidents and related costs. In defense of the system, 
commentators argue that worker's compensation 
originated as a bargain between employers and employees 
that was never intended to provide full compensation. 
Recently, however, dissatisfaction with the present 
state of the workers' compensation system has led some 
courts to reassess that bargain and to address existing 
deficiencies in workers' compensations law by acceding 
to employee efforts to establish exceptions to the 
exclusive remedy rule..." (Page 1648) 
Third party suits against contractors on a project other 
than the actual employer are clearly approved of by the author of 
the Note. At page 1651 he writes: 
"...When an accident is caused partly by a third party, 
the injured worker can sue that party for the entire 
amount of injury-related damages, no matter how small 
the third party's role in the accident...." 
The Note concluded that additional tort recovery would be 
equitable; it would contribute to compensation objectives and to 
proper safety incentives; statutory immunity should be construed 
narrowly and in light of history and policy every presumption 
should be on the side of preserving common law rights in the 
absence of compelling statutory language or social policy 
justification. (Page 1654) 
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Attention is invited to the decision in Young v. 
Environmental Air Products, 665 P.2nd 40 (Arizona, 1983) There 
the Court said: 
"We recognize that when the statutory employer concept 
is used as a device to immunize a remote employer, the 
objective of the Workmen's Compensation Act is not 
advanced, since1 the purpose of the Act is to protect 
the employee rather than the employer." Page 45. 
The Court in Young pointed out that the workmens' 
compensation statute should be strictly construed when used to 
deny an employee his common law rights to sue for tort damages. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff herein should be permitted a tort action suit 
against the subcontractor and general contractor neither of whom 
had any right to nor did they exercise any control over her work. 
Plaintiff was hired, paid and controlled by placer's Inc., whom 
she did not sue. 
Plaintiff should be permitted her suit herein because the 
1975 amendment of section 35-1-62 by the Utah Legislature 
expressly gave her such right. This is evidenced by the 
Legislature's use of the words "not occupying an employee-
employer relationship with the injured employee" instead of "in 
the same employment." 
The foregoing intent is established by the Legislative 
History of the 1975 amendment of section 35-1-62. The only 
person to testify as to the purpose of such amendment clearly 
points out it was intended to reverse prior court decisions and 
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to permit third party suits. In the context of this the only 
tort immunity given is to the employee's actual employer. 
The Hinds case, supra, and the Shupe case, supra, indicate 
UCA 35-1-62 authorizes an injured employee to bring an action 
against all other contractors on the job other than those who are 
his actual employer. 
Finally, the public policy of the State of Utah has been 
established by the Utah Legislature's enactment of the 1975 
amendment to section 35-1-62 and this Court's decisions 
subsequently enunciated. The philosophical views of the 
Associations and expressions of public policy principles to the 
contrary are therefore irrelevant. In any event, valid public 
policy arguments fully support a broadened right in employees to 
sue third party tort feasors on a project other than those in 
an actual employer relationship with the injured employee. 
Respectfully submitted this 11th day of December, 1987. 
Wp^rord A. Beesley ^ ^^ ~-
^ack Fairclough 
^EESLEY & FAIRCLOUGH 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
310 Deseret Book Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 538-2100 
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25, 1975. This recording was made on the Forty-Fourth 
day of the General Session of the Forty First Legislature. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Sophia C. Buckmiller 
Official Officer and 
Secretary, Utah State Senate 
My Commission expires May 1, 1S91 
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS AND TESTIMONY IN THE UTAH STATE 
SENATE,WHILE SITTING AS A COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE, CONCERNING 
SENATE BILL 26, AMENDMENTS TO THE WORKMENfS COMPENSATION ACT, 
SECOND READING, FEBRUARY 25, 1975 DISC 192. 
The Senate Secretary reads the 1975 proposed amendment to 
Section 35-1-62 as follows: 
"For the purposes of this section and 
notwithstanding the provisions of section 35-1-42, 
the injured employee or his heirs or personal 
representative may also maintain an action for 
damages against subcontractors, general 
contractors, independent contractors, property 
owners or their lessees or assigns, not occupying 
an employee-employer relationship with the injured 
or deceased employee at the time of his injury or 
death". 
The Secretary reads the provisions of Section 35-1-62 as 
they exist prior to amendment as follows: 
"When any injury or death for which compensation 
is payable under this title shall have been caused 
by the wrongful act or neglect of another person 
not in the same employment, the injured employee, 
or in case of death his dependents may claim 
compensation and the injured employee or his heirs 
or personal representative may also have an action 
for damages against such third person". 
Testimony is given by Paul Kunz, President, Utah Bar 
Association, as follows: 
"The law that was passed in 1921 had the 
wording 'wrongful act of a third person1. In 
1939 the words 'third person' were taken out 
and substituted therefore read 'the wrongful 
act or neglect of another person not in the 
same employment". 
"Now the result of this change has been that 
first let me take the situation prior to the 
change. The situation prior to the change 
was that if two men were working on a project 
and one was employed by say a general 
contractor and a third person could be an 
employee of a subcontractor, could be a 
delivery man, could be anyone who came on the 
job and injured the employee of the general 
contractor or killed him, such employee of 
the general contractor had a right of action 
against the wrongdoer for his damages in 
addition to his compensation"• 
"Now he didn't recover twice because what he 
recovered from the wrongdoer he had to pay 
back to the compensation insurance carrier, 
the State Fund or the private carrier as the 
case may be". 
"The result of changing this language from 
'third person' to 'not in the same 
employment' has resulted in a number of court 
decisions that have completely eliminated the 
protection that the worker had. One of the 
important things in the law that has been 
mentioned here today is the so-called 'fellow 
servant' rule. There is a great deal of 
safety in men who are concerned for each 
other who work for the same employer, who 
work under the same conditions. They come 
under the same safety rules. They come under 
the same foreman's inspection and so on". 
"But now that protection is lost when a 
stranger comes on the job and hurts them and 
the object of the change and this wording is 
to change the act to provide that when injury 
or death for which compensation is payable 
shall have been caused by the wrongful act or 
neglect of a person other than an employer or 
officer or agent of said employer then the 
injured man has his right of action". 
"It is a matter of clarification so that the 
injured man will know that of course he has 
no right of action against his own employer 
but when a stranger comes on the job whether 
it be a subcontractor, whether it be a 
delivery man or whether it be a stranger is 
subject to the same rules of safety and to 
the same obligation of law as to the injured 
man that any other stranger would be if we 
were going down the road or under any other 
circumstances and that is the purpose of this 
amendment". 
Senator Warren Pugh asks Mr. Kunz: 
"Are you in favor of this amendment? 
Mr. Kunz answers: 
"Yes, I am Senator. I think its a matter of simple 
justice that and also a matter of safety. This would 
permit third party suits but of course it would not 
permit suits against the employer as the law now 
stands. The amendment would have the effect of 
permitting third party suits". 
S B 26 was passed by the Senate on March 3, 1975 and was 
sent to the House on a vote of 2 6 ayes, 0 nays and 3 absent. It 
was passed by the House March 5, 1975 without amendment and was 
signed by the President of the Senate and transmitted to the 
Governor, who signed it into law. 
